



Schweizerische Eidgenossenschaft  
Confédération suisse  
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## REGIONAL SEMINAR

# DEFENSE AND SECURITY FORCES IN THE PREVENTION OF VIOLENT EXTREMISM IN AFRICA

Dakar les 9 et 10 octobre 2017

# GENERAL REPORT

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Africa is currently facing an escalation of violent extremism. Attacks perpetrated by violent extremist groups are spreading and are a serious constraint on the stakes of society, i.e: peace and security, human rights, development, etc.

While important, the security responses alone do not suffice and cannot in any way tackle the numerous factors produced and co-produced by violent extremism and offering a fertile ground for its acts to prosper over time. Realistically, it should be agreed that one single solution cannot be a response to a multi-faceted problem.

This absolute prerequisite to any effective action against violent extremism was addressed by the United Nations Secretary General in the “Plan of Action to Prevent Violent Extremism” of 24 December 2015, in which he underlined the need to adopt a more comprehensive approach including preventive measures to address the root causes of violent extremism, be they political, social, economic or military.

It is in the light of this panoptic approach that the first two editions of the Regional Conversations to Prevent Violent Extremism were held in Dakar in June 2016 and in N’jamena in June 2017.<sup>1</sup> During the meetings, the specific role of the Defense and Security Forces (DSF) was constantly addressed.

It was noted that while the Defense and Security Forces are key stakeholders in the stabilization process following acts of violent extremism, their behavior can cause problems, particularly when their deployment is coupled with exactions.

It was also agreed that the phenomenon of violent extremism is for the authorities and members of the Defense and Security Forces, a source of challenges that they may not necessarily be prepared to face.

Finally, the Conversations expressed their conviction that the Defense and Security Forces do have a key role to play in the prevention of violent extremism.

They can play such a role by lending themselves to a diagnosis of the problems linked to violent extremism and shared with all the other stakeholders and by championing

the idea that the security of human beings is the core of security; they should also engage in a dialogue with those they defend – citizens and populations – on the existing challenges and possible solutions.

It therefore seemed logically important to pursue the dialogue at the regional level by organizing the regional seminar of which the present general report reflects the main conclusions focused on the role of the Defense and Security Forces in the prevention of violent extremism. Indeed, the protection mandate of the Defense and Security Forces is not limited to the levels of a mere reaction (downstream). It also and mainly provides for an anticipation process to guarantee swiftness and efficiency (upstream).

The following questions were raised and were at the heart of the seminar:

- do the Defense and Security Forces have a role to play in the various aspects of prevention of violent extremism? How should such a role be defined vis-à-vis the State, the civil society stakeholders and the populations?

- how to facilitate and promote the creation of dialogue fora to foster a synergy of actions to prevent violent extremism ? How to develop a package of actions involving all the stakeholders: governments, civil society, Defense and Security Forces and armed groups?

- What are the collaboration and partnership tools and mechanisms between the Defense and Security Forces and the civil society actors for the prevention of violent extremism?

The present report highlights the adopted methodology, the substance of the deliberations, the main lessons learned, the proposals and recommendations and the perspective views of the Dakar regional seminar on the prevention of violent extremism.

## I Methodology

The seminar was jointly organized by the Centre for Higher Defense and Security Studies (CHEDS) of Senegal and the Federal Foreign Affairs Department of Switzerland on the theme: “The Defense and Security Forces in the Prevention of Violent Extremism in Africa”.

<sup>1</sup>« Investing in Peace and the Prevention of Violence in the Sahel-Sahara : Second Regional Talks on the Plan of action of the UN Secretary General for the Prevention of Violent Extremism » (IPI – UNOWAS - DFAE suisse, N’Djamena, Tchad, 31.05-1.06.2017) <https://www.ipinst.org/wp-content/uploads/2017/08/IPI-E-RPT-Chad-Meeting-NoteFrench.pdf>

« Investing in Peace to Prevent Violence in West Africa and the Sahel : Conversations on the UN Secretary General Plan of Action to Prevent Violent Extremism » (IPI – UNOWAS - DFAE suisse, Dakar, 27-28.06.2016) [https://www.ipinst.org/wp-content/uploads/2016/09/1609\\_Investing-in-Peace-FRENCH.pdf](https://www.ipinst.org/wp-content/uploads/2016/09/1609_Investing-in-Peace-FRENCH.pdf)

It was attended by fifty nine English and French speaking participants from West and Central African countries. The participants came from different backgrounds and included: representatives of the Defense and Security Forces (DSF), elected representatives, administrative officials, women, youth, civil society networks, regional organizations, research and training centers and resource persons.

The two (02) days seminar adopted a work method reconciling a sincere and exhaustive debate with speedy deliberations.

In this perspective, the seminar was articulated around three (03) introductory plenary meetings whose topics were addressed more in depth in the working groups organized as think tanks to share experience, exchange views and make recommendations.

## II Substance of deliberations

The meeting focused on the following specific themes: (1) preventing violent extremism in Africa: update and concepts; (2) Defense and Security Forces (DSF) and civilian actors in the prevention of violent extremism in Africa: practices, challenges and opportunities ; (3) preventing violent extremism : what synergy of actions in Africa ?

### II.1 Preventing violent extremism in Africa: update and concepts

After an update on the security situation and existing responses, the participants went further to define the concepts of human security and prevention of violent extremism.

#### a) Update on the security situation and relevant responses to violent extremism

Having noted that violent extremism cannot be generated ex nihilo, the seminar confirmed that its roots originate in the current security environment of the African continent. The key elements from the quick general presentation on the continent's current situation can be summarized as follows: exclusive governance and post-elections crises; multi-factor related poverty and running demography; health hazards due to the emergence and multiplication of transmissible and non-transmissible diseases; challenged physical security because of community conflicts, transnational criminality, arms and drug trafficking;

destruction of agricultural productions as a result of conflict recurrence; youth unemployment, etc. Such negative security data are the underlying political, social and even humanitarian causes leading communities to produce, co-produce or reproduce violence in its most extreme dimensions.

To date, the majority of responses to violent extremism were focused on security. Whether local, national, regional or even continental, the security response alone cannot do away with violent extremism in spite of its numerous assets because opposing violence to violence is not the solution to the problem. Furthermore, rather than reduce the offensives of the violent extremists, the responses of the Defense and Security Forces may all to the contrary stimulate them. When the army behaves as on conquered territory, without any respect for those it is supposed to defend, when the role and mandate of the vigilance committees are not clearly spelled out, when the intelligence shared by the communities is used for the wrong purpose, problems would tend to multiply.

*Furthermore*, the defense and security forces often seem powerless before the scope of the existing challenges:

*Firstly*, the efforts of the Defense and Security Forces are still too often viewed as an immediate response to the armed violence of extremists.

*Secondly*, the Defense and Security Forces are far from being a homogeneous and impermeable entity. Each of their components has its own history and experience in the area where it operates.

*Thirdly*, they are not the only stakeholders involved in responses to violent extremism. They cannot play all the civilian, political or economic roles of other stakeholders who by failing to be concomitantly operational can make the security response deceptive.

*Consequently*, meeting the challenge of violent extremism should no longer be the prerogative of the Defense and Security Forces. Facing violent extremism in Africa means reconciling security approaches with the dividends of human security and prevention.

## b) Clarification of the concepts of human security and prevention of violent extremism

Broadly speaking, human security refers to violent and classical threats such as war and armed violence but it also covers threats to development, health, poverty and the environment. Strictly speaking, the concept remains focused on the individual while integrating more areas than classical security. The participants addressed the issue of human security under this second angle. They placed man and woman, child and elderly, as well as communities at the heart of the collective and individual efforts needed to foster peace and security. The central position of the individual in the spiral of violence is often forgotten and the responses to protect him are often far away from this humanity focused objective. So much so that some stakeholders view the « collateral damages » to the populations as secondary or judge the actors of violent extremism as « outside humanity » or as monsters. Yet, both the former and the latter are often relatives, neighbors, members of communities, human beings with a past and a specific vision of their future.

Without venturing to give a definition of violent extremism, the seminar emphasized a shared obvious vision: understanding the prevention of violent extremism requires insight into the social, political and cultural environment and more particularly into the perceptions of the different stakeholders. Hence building a symbiotic relationship between the stakeholders is indispensable. The commitment of society as a whole, including political leaders, administrators, the Defense and Security Forces, civil society (men women, youth, NGOs), religious and traditional leaders, the medias, the private sector, researchers, regional and international organizations, etc., is necessary.

To consolidate such an “esprit de corps” between all sectors of society, the relations between the Defense and Security Forces and the populations will have to change. The latter are recognized by the authorities as the best protection against violence. Their cooperation has become urgent and essential and should come along with an analysis of violent extremism based on their own references.

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<sup>2</sup>ISS, August 2016: Mali's young jihadists – fuelled by faith or circumstance . <https://www.issafrica.org/uploads/policy-brief89-fr.pdf>

Indeed, the concepts of radicalization and jihadist terrorism find little echo within the populations of the sahelo-sahelian region as opposed to issues relating to governance, identity quest, political participation, socio-economic perspectives and decent behaviors on the part of the Defense and Security Forces. Furthermore, without the support of the populations, the extremist armed groups would not exist. Hence, engaging in a dialogue with the populations would also mean taking the risk, or rather opening up windows of dialogue opportunities with the violent extremists.

Respecting the populations, paying honest attention to their needs, building mutual confidence between them and the Defense and Security Forces while continuously making efforts for dialogue at all interaction levels, from the family to the political levels and from the civilian to the military, are necessary pre-requisites to finding sustainable solutions.

## II.2 Defense and Security Forces (DSF) and civil society actors in the prevention of violent extremism in Africa: practices, challenges and opportunities

The assessment of existing challenges was done after the presentation of concrete examples of involvement of the Defense and Security Forces and of civilian stakeholders in the prevention of violent extremism.

### a) Sharing concrete experience on the involvement of the Defense and Security Forces and civilian actors in the prevention of violent extremism

While current practices may hint that the involvement of Defense and Security Forces in the prevention of violent extremism seems rather timid, the experience and initiatives in Burkina Faso prove a real willingness to involve them in the prevention of violent extremism. They are viewed as a necessary linkage for the operationalization of some preventive actions which could be divided into four main categories.

**The need for a State presence and the Rule of Law:** The presence of the State in the lives of the populations and the existence of the Rule of Law are pre-requisites for security.

To build a friendly environment to fight insecurity and the degradation of social cohesion,

the training curricula of the Defense and Security Forces in Burkina Faso include from now on a section on International Humanitarian Law (IHL) and specific legal areas such as the Rights of the Child; they are supported by the creation of a pool of dedicated trainers. Control structures (Police of the Police) have been established to instill some morality into the behavior of the Defense and Security Forces and some special units have been created (ONASIM, CLND, ANR, community police, etc.) to enhance the professionalization of the officers. This will facilitate a rational distribution of tasks and will guarantee a sterling execution of missions.

**Getting the populations involved:** Even if the way is still long to citizen participation, it should be underlined that to inform the populations about the various security related administrative decisions, communication bridges were built between the Defense and Security Forces and the medias through the media services of the existing organizations.

**Building resilience to face violent extremism:** the behavior of the Defense and Security Forces is important for the identification of the adapted type of response to violent extremists' acts. Truly, the quality of the response develops the capacity of the populations to resist the multiple pressures of violent extremists, dissipates the fears of retaliation, builds and maintains mutual understanding and confidence and consolidates collaboration between the two stakeholders. To that effect, in addition to such initiatives as the "G5 Sahel", some reforms are currently in progress in most countries of the Sahel, to adapt the response capacity of the Defense and Security Forces to the threat of violent extremism.

**Civilian-military cooperation/coordination :** some examples were highlighted such as the open days on the Defense and Security Forces, the formalization of their internal communication services, as well as the interactive debates on major security issues which all contribute to improve communication with the populations.

Furthermore, some community actions with a social interest were rolled out by the Defense and Security Forces for the benefit of the populations (family consultations in health clinics, supply of drinkable water, support for crossing, etc.) and contributed to improve their fame, image and reputation and to maintain fruitful and sustainable relations between civilians and military.

*In fine*, the recruitment modalities within the Defense and Security Forces based on an equitable representation of all the communities led to the establishment of a more inclusive army which better represents the diversity of the society and is more likely to be in tune with the populations.

Such momentums developed by the Defense and Security Forces are further supported by actions of the civil society actors and also research structures which analyze the phenomenon of violent extremism from the point of view of the stakeholders involved.

The ISS<sup>3</sup> thus came to the following conclusions:

- Factors that are neither of an economic, religious or ideological nature explain the presence of youth in the jihadist armed groups in Mali;
- The desire to be protected and to protect one's family, one's community or one's economic activity seems to be a key factor of enrolment;
- In most cases, there is an imbrication of factors; looking for a sole and unique reason for enrolment is therefore to no avail;
- It is important to analyze in details the local realities leading to youth enrolment and resist the temptation of applying the conclusions to other contexts;
- The currently fashionable notions of « radicalization », « de-radicalization » and « violent extremism » must be used with prudence as they can engender inappropriate responses.

## b) Meeting challenges

"Ideologies are not defeated with guns, they are defeated by better ideas – a more attractive and convincing vision » .

To operationalize such a vision, the Defense and Security Forces, the civilians and all the other stakeholders involved in the prevention of violent extremism must seize all the existing opportunities to meet challenges. Such opportunities include, inter alia:

- Training, educating, sensitizing and controlling the populations to encourage citizen participation. Education programs should be designed to that end and civil society organizations should effectively contribute to citizen participation in security governance by sharing more information with the populations on the security related administrative decisions.

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<sup>3</sup> Speech by Barack Obama at the Leaders Summit on countering ISIL and violent extremism, October 2015.

- Introducing a legitimate democratic governance to facilitate citizen participation in the management of public actions would guarantee citizen control and provide the populations with better chances of access to resources. It means integrating the concerns of the youth and women in the public policies.
- Creating specific quick win programs. In Burkina Faso, for instance, the Government adopted in June 2017, a specific emergency program for the Sahel region – bordering also Mali and Niger – which is a target of recurrent terrorist attacks, to improve the security conditions and reinforce the resilience of the populations.
- Multiply meeting opportunities between the Defense and Security Forces and the populations, to build true confidence which is the basis for a good collaboration between stakeholders.
- Use empirical data as a basis for reflection, to ensure that the research results are taken on board in the decision making sphere.

#### **II.4 Preventing violent extremism: what synergy of actions are needed in Africa?**

Preventing violent extremism requires building a new form of governance and creating bridges between stakeholders who do not usually work together.

##### **a) Creating a new form of governance**

Africa's situation today shows that governance and security are closely intertwined: simple bad governance factors can generate complex security issues. Such observation is evidenced by peace building initiatives such as the Nigeria Stability and Reconciliation Program (NSRP). Its main mandate is to reduce conflicts' escalation in Nigeria.

After defining first the existence of a violence cycle originating in different factors such as property policy, poverty, inequalities, under-employment, the NSRP concluded that breaking the vicious circle of violence demands a change of paradigm coupled with the adoption of a new mode of governance. Such governance should provide practical and objective answers to grievances; involve the populations in the security policies; reinforce the conflict management mechanisms; ensure a fair distribution of natural resources; strengthen inclusion, cooperation and coordination;

increase the participation of women in the security policies and have a proper control of poverty reduction factors.

In reality, violent extremism singles itself out because of its multidimensional and complex nature. The multidimensional nature of the threat demands a different form of governance, free of authoritarian and unilateral systems and based on a comprehensive and shared governance. The latter choice requires openness and the contribution of different stakeholders.

##### **b) Building bridges between stakeholders**

The State, the Defense and Security Forces, the religious and traditional leaders, the civil society organizations, the vulnerable groups (youth, women and the elderly), the private sector, the development partners, the bilateral and multilateral cooperation bodies should all “play as a team”. Such team game is necessary both at national and at international levels.

Building bridges between domestic stakeholders commands some pre-requisites. These include, among other things, having healthier civilian-military relations, promoting dialogue and understanding the concept of “dialogue synergy”, structuring a synergy of actions based on a common vision and a strategic partnership, etc. The pre-requisites will be the building blocks for:

- The harmonization of the institutional and legal framework which means creating a synergy for the elaboration of national legislations, the ratification of legal and regional instruments and the drafting of memoranda of understanding between the different units.
- Implementing the conditions for preventive and repressive cooperation. These include collaboration between public services to counter the preparation of offences through information sharing, intelligence exchange, extradition agreement and legal cooperation.
- Sharing ideas, information and means to face the terrorist threat.
- Resolving the coordination and cooperation problems resulting from the personal and institutional selfishness of organizations.

### III Main lessons learnt, proposals and recommendations

Meeting to address the theme « Defense and Security Forces in the Prevention of Violent Extremism in Africa » the fifty-nine participants from very different backgrounds wish as a general objective, to contribute to current initiatives on the prevention of violence and of violent extremism in particular, in West Africa and the Sahel. They more specifically wish to : better understand the perceptions and roles of the Defense and Security Forces and civil society, as well as their interaction for the prevention of violent extremism; share good practices and experience; open up a dialogue between stakeholders from different backgrounds and create linkages to prevent violent extremism and its related threats; create/promote inclusive moments at the national, regional and international levels and build or restore confidence between the stakeholders.

The rich debate and notable quality of the speakers facilitated the adoption of a number of lessons and recommendations shedding light on: the way the Defense and Security Forces view their own role vis-à-vis extreme violence; the populations' perception of the presence and actions of the Defense and Security Forces; the building of bridges between the Defense and Security Forces (representing the State in the areas directly affected by violent extremism), the population (directly affected by such violence) and the other categories of stakeholders.

**The first lesson** relates to the socio-political nature of violent extremism. Generally viewed from a limited angle, i.e, through its manifestations (terrorism, suicide attacks, asymmetrical wars, destruction of public assets, etc.), violent extremism is very quickly presented as an external pathology to the social fabric, as an exogenous malfunction to be eradicated to guarantee a proper functioning of society. Yet, the empirical data and sound analyses presented during the seminar have mitigated such effortless interpretation of the reality.

Violent extremism results from the socio-political context of African States. Governance deficits (bad governance), social and economic inequalities, political exclusion of minorities, self-indulgence of the authorities and many other factors build and re-construct violent extremism.

Viewed from this angle, violence ceases to be an end in itself for the extremist and becomes for the latter an instrument, a mobilized resource to reach political and social objectives.

The **second lesson** underlines the importance of understanding the context. The ability to understand the contexts and individuals in order to act knowingly and to ensure that all undertakings are useful and successful will help avoid the « copy and paste » trap. This notion demands a clear understanding of the context and stakeholders, as well as the logic behind their actions, their expectations, etc. It will command seeking appropriate solutions to specific situations.

To succeed, a close interaction between the world of research and the political world will be necessary. Indeed, an in depth analyses on the specific local conditions of violence will avoid an all too quick reaction of the State based on undocumented and pre-conceived ideas and fears and leading more often than not to dangerous over-excitement in military operations. The studies which have already been undertaken demonstrate that commitment within extremist groups is rarely motivated by religion alone, but mostly by protection logic or economic reasons. They also demonstrate that there is a big difference in the commitment motivations of the violent groups' leadership – usually absent from the field of violence – and the “infantry”. Making a difference between the leadership and the members and applying differentiated measures to them will contribute to a better prevention of threat.

The third lesson emphasizes the key role of the Defense and Security Forces in the prevention of violent extremism.

*Firstly*, the Defense and Security Forces must imperatively be republican, which means that they should represent at all levels, all the communities while serving the Republic. The African armies are still marked by their colonial heritage and often appear as praetorian guards rather than national armies. It means that the Defense and Security Forces should no longer be manipulated by politicians for reasons that do not have much to do with peace or security – but rather everything to do with the interests of surviving political elites.

The seminar hence recommended the promotion of a dialogue between the politicians and the Defense and Security Forces.

Secondly, prevention should be added to their classical role of protection. The senior army officials and Heads of State have a specific responsibility at this level. Without a clear message from them – to be translated into a national legal framework – the lower ranks cannot take upon themselves such a prevention mandate which is not assigned to defense missions as they are currently defined in numerous States. The Defense and Security Forces must therefore be trained to depict this new form of violence in order to use good judgement and adopt measures to prevent its being reproduced over time.

The fourth lesson is on the participation of the populations. The role of women, youth, community and religious leaders in prevention was considered the starting point for a sound management of the prevention policy of violent extremism. It was agreed for instance that it is for local communities and their leaders to take the initiative to promote peace in the region. For the time being, the repeated negligence of the State (faulty economic policies, abandoned areas, health and education programs having no impact on the population, indifference of the State to migration issues, etc.) and the general under-utilisation of the populations in the development of policies to prevent violent extremism will not lead to the resilience of civilians often caught between their mistrust of the Defense and Security Forces and the violence of the extremist groups.

Furthermore, the civilians must dismantle their mistrust vis-à-vis the Defense and Security Forces. They should make the effort to get close to them, engage in a dialogue with them, share their concerns, get to know them better because even though the Defense and Security Forces have the power of arms, they are also victims of violent extremism just like the civilians.

As experienced in Agadez, the establishment of regional dialogue committees involving the Defense and Security Forces and the populations proves that a climate of confidence can be built between the civilians and the Defense and Security Forces.

In the same vein, the civil society organizations must roll out an outreach strategy to guide the psycho cognitive (attitude and behavior) mindset of the Defense and Security Forces.

They often see in civil society, a diffuse,

un-circumscribed, poorly coordinated, highly politicized and externally financed planet inviting caution on their part.

The seminar addressed in depth the dire need of a political commitment for the implementation of an effective policy of prevention of violent extremism. The Defense and Security Forces can no longer be involved only as a State force in this endeavor. Politicians must be aware of the risks involved in the trivialization of violence; they should know the consequences of the selfishness and passivity of the institutions as well as the dividends of the dialogue.

On the medias, the participants unanimously recognized that they only rarely play their role of objective information. It was noted that the international medias in particular, are biased in their way of processing information and stigmatization, that they often distort the local perception of violent extremism and remain silent on its root causes. It is therefore urgent to train them on how to prevent violent extremism.

Initiating a « collective game » and synergetic impacts on all the categories of stakeholders was another strategic and absolutely decisive lesson learnt.

The idea being emphasized here is that the stakeholders will draw a substantive added value from their collective performance and will successfully achieve together some results that none of them would achieve singlehandedly.

In this framework, resources from all the stakeholders should contribute to the elaboration of a policy for the prevention of violent extremism at the national as well as regional levels.

It was thus advised to multiply the dialogue fora and consultation frameworks between the different categories of stakeholders meeting in Dakar to:

- foster understanding and a joint management of the prevention of such violence;
- harmonize the domestic legal and institutional frameworks of States;
- facilitate peace and national security fora, national conferences or a grand debate on security;
- give Parliaments the necessary authority and independence to empower the political stakeholders;

- let the Defense and Security Forces express themselves more often;
- let the latter move away from their rigidity, silence and secrecy;
- Observe, in fine, that dialogue already exists within each group of stakeholders and often between them, but not systematically.

Over and beyond the need for local stakeholders to seize such consultation frameworks' opportunities, the seminar stressed that rather than multiplying the "top-down" strategies and programs, the regional and international organizations should focus on initiating such dialogue fora and on providing the necessary means (financial and technical) for their effective materialization at local, national and regional levels.

The idea of the participation of violent extremists in the dialogue was a novelty for most participants.

This hypothesis remains difficult and complex and must be addressed on a case by case basis, without generalizing. Hence, if a decision is made to engage a dialogue, there should be no confusion between dialogue and negotiation which is the responsibility of the State alone: the political support is necessary.

A dialogue is however always possible – through the Ulemas, as in Mauritania, or in other forms.

#### **IV Future perspective**

The regional seminar recalled the need for a societal response – supported collectively by the different categories of stakeholders – to violent extremism and emphasized in particular the role of the Defense and Security Forces in the prevention of violent extremism in Africa.

It was clearly an important beginning, a seed not to be minimized. The results of this meeting therefore deserve a renewed and sustained attention in the short, medium and long terms.

To facilitate dissemination and ownership, a panel discussion will be organized on the occasion of the International Forum on Peace and Security to be held on 13 and 14 November ; The theme: "Building Resilience and the Rule of Law for the Prevention and Fight against Violent Extremism and Terrorism" will be addressed by the Forum.

The results of the seminar will also be used as a background to stimulate ideas and exchange experience for the participants in the next regional Conversations on the prevention of violent extremism.

**General Rapporteur:** Dr Christian E. POUT, President, African Centre for Economic and Strategic Studies – CEIDES (Cameroon)

**Editing:** Centre de Hautes Etudes de Défense et de Sécurité – CHEDS (Sénégal) Editin : Centre for Higher Defense and Security Studies – CHEDS (Senegal)

**10.11.2017**

## Program

**Sunday 8 October 2017**

**18.00 - 19.00**                    **Arrival of participants**

*Briefing session with organizers, panelists, chairmen and rapporteurs of plenaries and working groups*

**20.00**                            **For visiting guests: Dinner at the hotel**

**Monday 9 October 2017**

**8.30 - 9.00**                    **WELCOME-SETTLEMENT**

**9.00 - 9.30**                    **OPENING CEREMONY**

*Major General Paul NDIAYE, Executive Director, Centre for Higher Defense and Security Studies (CHEDS), Senegal Ambassador Marion WEICHEL, Ambassador of Switzerland to Senegal Dr Augustin TINE, Minister of Armed Forces, Republic of Senegal*

**9.30 - 10.00**                    **Group photo  
Media briefing**

**10.00 - 10.30**                    **Coffee break**

**10.30 - 12.00**                    **PLENARY 1**

*Preventing violent extremism in Africa : update and concepts*

*The objective of this plenary is to have an update on the security situation and relevant responses and to understand the concepts of human security and prevention of violent extremism.*

*Chairman: Major General Paul NDIAYE, Executive Director, Centre for Higher Defense and Security Studies (CHEDS), Senegal*

**Panelists:**

*Larry GBEVLO LARTEY, Executive Director, African Centre for Studies and Research on Terrorism*

*Rémie FOTUE KAMNE, Director, Chad Centre for Strategic-Studies (CTES), Chad*

*Kouider ZERROUK, Chief of Communication and Public Information, United Nations Regional Office for West Africa and the Sahel - UNOWAS*

*Colonel Mohamed ABOU TARKA, President, High Authority for Peace Consolidation (HACP), Niger*

*Amb. Jean-Daniel BIELER, Special Advisor, Human Security Division , Federal Foreign Affairs Department (DFAE), Switzerland*

Discussion

*Christian POUT, general rapporteur*

**12.00 - 13.30**

### **PLENARY 2**

*Defense and Security Forces (DSF) and civilian stakeholders in the prevention of violent extremism in Africa : practices, challenges and opportunities*

*The objective of this plenary is to take stock of concrete examples of involvement of the Defense and Security Forces and of civilian stakeholders in the prevention of violent extremism. It will also make an assessment of the obstacles met, challenges to face and opportunities to seize.*

#### **Chairman:**

*Super intendant Mohamed DENNA, Regional Coordinator of the Cooperation Platform for Security, G5 Sahel*

#### **Panelists:**

*Sandy AFRICA, Deputy Director, Sub-Saharan Africa Division, Geneva Centre for the Democratic Control of Armed Forces (DCAF), Suisse.*

*Colonel Ousmane TRAORE, Governor of the Eastern Region, Burkina Faso  
Police Captain Chefou ABDOU, Chief of Anti-terrorist intelligence Division, National Police, Niger.*

*Mohamed ANACKO, President of the Agadez Regional Counsel, Niger  
Lori Anne THEROUX-BENONI, Director, ISS Dakar.*

Discussion

#### **Rapporteur :**

*Christian POUT, general rapporteur*

#### **Lunch break**

**14.30 - 16.30**

### **WORKING GROUPS**

*Preventing violent extremism in Africa: inward analysis by each stakeholder of his role and action*

*This first working group should clarify the meaning of the prevention of violent extremism and the role that each stakeholder views as his. Three (03) working groups are set up with a mix of participants from the Defense and Security Forces, civil society organizations and regional institutions. Each group has a facilitator and a rapporteur. The discussions are interactive; Each group will come up with 3 to 5 concrete recommendations on the role of each stakeholder in prevention.*

#### **Group 1**

*Chairman/facilitator GT.1 : El Hadj Alioune SAMBA  
Major General (ret.), former Ambassador*

## Program

*Rapporteur GT.1 : Abdoulaye MAIGA  
Program Officer and analyst, Early Warning Directorate, ECOWAS  
Participants : (to be specified at the meeting)*

### **Group 2**

*Chairman/facilitator GT.2 : Colonel Idriss Haggar MAHAMAT  
Cabinet Director Ministry of Defense, Chad*

*Rapporteur GT.2 : Selly BA  
Researcher, FASTEf, Université Cheikh Anta Diop de Dakar (UCAD), Senegal  
Participants : (to be specified at the meeting)*

### **Group 3**

*Chairman/facilitator GT.3 : Godefroy BARANDAGIYE  
Special Assistant to the African Union High Representative for Mali  
& the Sahel (MISAHEL)*

*Rapporteur GT.3 : Zipporah NDIONE  
Coordinator, Young Women's Network for Peace, Senegal  
Participants : (to be specified at the meeting)*

**16.30 - 17.00**

**Coffee break**

**17.30 - 18.00**

**FEEDBACK BY WORKING GROUPS IN PLENARY**

*Presentation of the conclusions of the working groups by the facilitators and/or rapporteurs followed by a discussion.*

**20.00**

*For visiting guests : Dinner at the hotel*

**Tuesday 10 Octobre 2017**

**08.30 - 09.00**

**RECAP OF PREVIOUS DAY DISCUSSIONS/ PRESENTATION OF THE DAY'S AGENDA**

**09.00 - 10.30**

**PLENARY 3**

*Preventing violent extremism: what synergy of actions in Africa?*

*Preventing violent extremism requires building a new form of governance and creating bridges between stakeholders who do not usually work together. The objective of this plenary is to propose interventions for this set of stakeholders using as a basis the common understanding of stakes as well as a strategic collaboration and partnership.*

**Chairman:**

*Abdoulaye MOHAMADOU, Deputy Executive Secretary,  
Conseil de l'Entente*

### Panelists:

*Lieutenant-colonel Famouké CAMARA, Instructor, Alioune Blondin Beye Peacekeeping School (EMP), Mali*

*Dr. Godwin R. MURUNGA, Executive Secretary, CODESRIA*

*Mathurin HOUNGNIKPO, Expert in civilian-military relations, Secretariat of the National Security Council (S-CNS), Côte d'Ivoire*

*Hajiya Hamsatou ALLAMIN, Director, Nigeria stability and reconciliation program (NSRP), Nigeria*

### Discussion

*Christian POUT, rapporteur général*

10.30 - 11.00

**Coffee break**

11.00 - 13.00

### WORKING GROUP

*What are the shared governance mechanisms for the prevention of violent extremism?*

*Participants exchange views on the following issues in the working groups: What avenues are open for dialogue between Defense and Security Forces, civil society organizations and regional institutions for the prevention of violent extremism? How to maintain exchange at different levels? How to disseminate such a mechanism? Three (03) working groups are set up with a mix of participants from the Defense and Security Forces, civil society organizations and regional institutions. Each working group has a facilitator and a rapporteur. The discussions are interactive. Each group will come up with 3 to 5 concrete recommendations on the theme of interaction between stakeholders.*

### Group 4

*Chairman/facilitator GT.4 : Ifeoma Ojemeni OKALI Former Lead Counsel (Prosecutions), United Nations International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda*

*Rapporteur GT.4 : Almany KAMARA Military advisor, UNOWAS  
Participants GT.4 : (to be specified at the meeting)*

### Group 5

*Chairman/facilitator GT.5 Colonel Hypolithe Jean NDOUGOU  
Deputy Executive Secretary Lake Chad Basin Commission / Joint Multinational Force (CBLC-FMM)*

*Rapporteur GT.5 : Kiswendsida Noëlie KOURAOGO Blogger, Burkina Faso  
Participants GT.5 : (to be specified at the meeting)*

## Program

### **Group 6**

*Chairman/facilitator GT.6 : BOUARE Bintou Founé SAMAKE  
President, Women in law and development in Africa – WILDAF / Mali*

*Rapporteur GT.6 : Mamadou BEYE Researcher, Higher Institute of  
Management, Université Cheikh Anta Diop, Dakar (UCAD), Senegal  
Participants GT.6 : (to be specified at the meeting)*

**13.00 - 14.30**

**Lunch break**

**14.30 - 16.00**

**FEEDBACK FROM WORKING GROUPS IN PLENARY**

*Presentation of the conclusions of working groups by the facilitators and/or  
rapporteurs followed by a discussion.*

**16.00 - 16.15**

**Coffee break**

**16.15 - 17.00**

**CLOSING SESSION**

**General report**

*Christian POUT, President, African Centre of International Studies,  
Diplomacy and Economic Strategies (CEIDES), Cameroun Salient points  
of the debates, recommendations*

*Statements by the organisers*

*Carol MOTTET, Senior Advisor, Human Security Division, Federal Foreign  
Affairs Department (DFAE), Switzerland*

*Major General Paul NDIAYE, Executive Director, Centre for Higher Defense  
and Security Studies (CHEDS), Senegal*

**18.30**

**COCKTAIL**

**General Rapporteur: Dr. Christian E. POUT, President, African  
Center International, Diplomatic Economic and Strategic Studies  
- CEIDES (Cameroon)**

**Editing: Center for Advanced Defense and Security Studies  
- CHEDS (Senegal)**



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